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This  paper  examines  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of demand-side  subsidy  approaches
for improving poor households'  access to housing services.  It begins with a discussion of
the  rationale  for  stand-alone  housing  assistance  programs  and  a  description  of the
ongoing  transition  away  from traditional  supply-side  housing assistance  to demand-side
subsidies.  The  paper  presents  model  demand-side  approaches,  but  also  draws  on  real
world  examples  to  highlight  various  aspects  of program  design  related  to  targeting,
transparency,  price  distortion,  institutional  capacity,  administrative  complexity,  and
funding.  It  also  describes  how  variations  in  the  design  of  housing-related  subsidy
programs  can  appear  in response  to philosophical,  political,  and resource considerations.
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I: Introduction
This  paper  presents  an  overview  of several  demand-side  subsidies  that  governments  of
developing countries have been using to increase  access to housing services among the poor.
It is based  on a review of existing  literature and  is intended  to be  a non-technical  guide  to
help government  officials,  policymakers,  and others to  assess their options  for assisting the
poor. Because  any of the  approaches  presented  here might be appropriate  depending  on the
situation in question, this paper does not attempt to define "best practices."  Policymakers will
have to weigh the strengths and limitations of each approach  in deciding which one to use.
The remainder  of this  paper  consists  of five  sections.  The  following  section  presents
common reasons for governments  to intervene in the provision of housing  services.  The third
section contains a brief overview of trends in the housing  sector that have  led to the kinds of
programs  that  governments  are  implementing  today.  The  fourth  section  describes  basic
demand-side  approaches  for  subsidizing  the  housing  expenditures  of  households  and
discusses  their theoretical  advantages  and disadvantages.  This  is followed  by a fifth section
that explores several key implementation topics and discusses how institutional  capacity and
administrative costs can affect outcomes.  The sixth and final section summarizes the pros and
cons of these approaches and describes situations for which each might be appropriate.
II: Rationales for Government Intervention
The  relative  importance  of the  various  rationales  for  government  intervention  in  the
housing sector depends  on one's point of view.  From the perspective  of a social safety net,
the  main justification  for providing  housing  assistance  is  that  adequate  shelter  is a basic
need  that governments  have  a responsibility  to  help to  fulfill,  especially  during times of
hardship. Although housing assistance programs may already form part of a country's basic
economic  security system,  governments  often  introduce  new programs  or expand  existing
ones  as  remedial  measures  following  unexpected  severe  economic  shocks  or  natural
disasters.  Housing  assistance  programs  can  keep  families  from  sliding  into  poverty  after
such  shocks.  In  transition  countries,  instead  of  simply  being  a  response  to  a  crisis,
programs  providing the poor with assistance  with their housing-related  expenditures  have
been  set up in anticipation of them experiencing  hardship  from planned price  increases.  In
these cases,  the introduction of housing assistance  makes  it possible to  implement reforms
such as price increases  or deregulation.
iWe would like to thank John Blomquist, Michael Haney, and Chris Jones  for their constructive  comments.Housing  assistance  programs  can  also  satisfy  other  goals  that  are  important to  many
policymakers.  For  example,  some  programs  may  promote  homeownership  and  the
development  of the  private  sector.  Housing  and housing-related  infrastructure  programs  can
encourage  community  development  or  neighborhood  revitalization  initiatives.  Promoting
labor mobility has also been increasingly  used as a rationale for housing assistance.  Housing
programs  can also  support  economic  development  by helping  people to  set  up home-based
businesses.  At a much broader level, a shift away from supply-oriented subsidies to demand-
side subsidies can form part of a strategy to develop  a market-based  housing sector.
There  are  several reasons  for implementing  a stand-alone  housing assistance  program
instead  of incorporating  it into  a general  cash benefit program.  Ensuring  a minimum  level
of consumption  of these  goods  among the  poor is one  reason,  but other reasons  are more
pragmatic.  Housing expenditures can make up a  large portion of the budget of low-income
households,  and  benefit  levels  are  often  correspondingly  high.  Securing  political  support
for  expensive  programs  is  easier  when  benefits  are  earmarked.  The  funding  source  also
influences  the  choice  of  the  subsidy  delivery  system.  When  international  donors  are
involved,  they may express  a preference  for  stand-alone  programs  because they may have
earmarked  funds that cannot be used as general  cash assistance.
III: Trends in the Housing Sector
Several  trends  have  emerged  in  the  housing  sector  that  have  influenced  government
policies.  Governments  everywhere  have  faced  increasing  fiscal  constraints,  and  this  has
motivated  them to seek ways  to  enhance their  revenues  and  cut costs. The relatively  high
cost of many housing programs makes them obvious  candidates for reform.  On the revenue
side,  governments  have  introduced  fees,  raised  rents  and  fees,  and  increased  collection
rates.  On  the expenditure  side,  governments  have  looked  for ways  to cut  and  rationalize
subsidies.  Often  these  measures  are  implemented  as  a part  of a  broad  package  of sector
reforms,  which  might  aim,  for  example,  to  decentralize  responsibility  for  housing  and
housing-related  services or to privatize state-owned  housing.  With this pressure to extract  a
greater contribution from households comes  the need to protect the poor from the impact of
sector reforms.
In  the  housing  sector  in  developing  countries,  there  has  been  a  trend  away  from
traditional  supply-side  assistance  to  demand-side  subsidies.  Traditional  supply-side
housing programs include  government-built  public housing and other so-called  "bricks and
mortar"  subsidies  given  to  the  producers  of housing,  including,  for  example,  subsidized
financing,  contributions of land and materials,  and tax credits  and deductions. With all such
programs,  producers  are obligated  to pass on part of the subsidy to households  by charging
below-market  rents for the units that they produce. From the perspective  of households, the
key  characteristic  of any  supply-side  housing  program  is  the  lack  of choice,  in  that  a
household  must take  or leave  what the  producer  offers.  In contrast,  demand-side  housing
programs  channel  subsidies  directly  to  the  household  through  cash-like  allowances  or
grants.  Typically,  the  household  pays  the  market  price  and  is  allowed  to  select  its home
from a. variety of suppliers.  Demand-side  subsidies have  been used in transition  economies
to  protect  households  from  rent  increases  during  these countries'  shift to  a market-based
system of housing provision.  In market economies,  demand-side  subsidies have  been used
to increase the transparency  and effectiveness  of subsidies.
2The story of the  supply-oriented  1970s  and  1980s  demonstrates  the pitfalls  of direct
government  involvement  in  the  production,  financing,  and  allocation  of housing.  This
experience  provided  the  impetus  for the  market-driven  demand-side  approaches  that took
hold  during  the  1990s  (see  World  Bank  1993).2  In  the  1970s,  the  main  objectives  of
governments  and donors were to provide affordable  land and housing for the poor,  attain a
high degree  of cost recovery,  and  to replicate  the  results. Policymakers  emphasized  "sites
and  services"  projects  that  were  intended  to  demonstrate  the  feasibility  of providing
minimum-standard  houses  with  secure  tenure  and  basic  services.  Unfortunately,  these
projects encountered  many problems.  Too  often, targeting  was  weak  so units ended  up  in
the hands of higher-income  households,  either through the initial  allocation of units  or the
subsequent turnover of units. In  some instances,  projects  failed because  people would not
occupy  undesirable  sites  that  were  too  far from  their jobs and  important  services.  Also,
poor households often lacked the additional  resources  needed to finish their homes, and the
limits  of the  concept  of self-help  became  evident.  Cost  recovery  efforts  were  often very
poor,  and this  effectively  increased  the  subsidy  received  by  households  and  made  it  less
likely that the projects  could be replicable.
In the  1980s,  there was  a shift toward  implementing  projects  aimed  at providing  the
poor with financing to buy housing, often through public financial  institutions.  One of the
main goals  was  to  create  self-supporting  financial  agencies  that  would  lend  to  low-  and
moderate-income  households.  Finance  was  seen  as  a  mechanism  that  could  increase
households'  own contributions  and thereby reduce  subsidies.  Unfortunately  many  housing
finance  projects  encountered  problems  that  threatened  their  long-term  viability.  Interest
rates on loans were  often highly  subsidized,  and in countries with high inflation, the value
of repayments in real terms quickly declined,  limiting the ability of financial  institutions to
recover  costs. High default rates  combined with weak foreclosure laws  often made  it even
more difficult to recover costs.  In some instances,  the public financial  institutions that were
running the loan programs hesitated to take harsh actions against households  for defaulting
on their  repayments,  which reduced  their  incentive  to  pay.  Even  with  heavily  subsidized
interest rates, the terms of the loans were often not affordable  to the truly poor. Frequently
the loans were tied to the purchase  of newly constructed  units built by the government  or
by private developers to the government's specifications.3
By the  1990s,  governments  concentrated  on making the housing  sector  function  better
through  an  integrated  approach  that  focused  on  both  demand  and  supply  issues.  On  the
demand side,  policymakers  started  focusing on clarifying and  strengthening  property rights,
instituting market-rate  housing finance,  and targeting subsidies to households using demand-
side approaches.  On the supply side, policymakers began to upgrade existing housing instead
of building "sites  and services"  housing  and new housing.  Some program  sponsors began to
incorporate  beneficiaries'  input into  the  design  and  implementation  of their  projects,  thus
making  them  feel  like  stakeholders.  Policymakers  also  focused  heavily  on  introducing
regulatory and institutional reforms that would better serve everyone involved  in the housing
sector,  especially  the  private  sector.  Governments  increasingly  aimed  to  facilitate  the
2 This is  an invaluable document for gaining a basic understanding of current ideas in  housing policy.
3A  good  example  of this type of lending is the  homeownership  credit  program  (KPR)  operated  by the  state
savings  bank  (Bank Tabungan  Negara) in Indonesia  in the  late  1970s  and  1980s.  See  Struyk,  Hoffrnan,  and
Katsura (1  990)  for an evaluation of this program.
3development of a vibrant private  sector capable of adequately  sheltering a  large  share of the
population,  thus reducing the need for public housing assistance.
In 1993,  the World  Bank articulated  the views that the global housing policy community
had begun to embrace  when it recommended:  (i) making  subsidies transparent;  (ii) targeting
subsidies on the poor; (iii) switching to demand-side subsidies; and (iv) monitoring  subsidies.
It discouraged:  (i)  subsidizing public housing  construction;  (ii)  hidden  subsidies;  (iii) using
subsidies that distort prices; and (iv) rent control.4
It has not been easy for many policymakers  to break out of the traditional  supply-side
mentality.  However,  as  experience  with  these  newer principles  has  grown,  policymakers
and  beneficiaries  have  gradually accepted  them. While  most countries  today still continue
to  operate  a  range of supply-side  programs,  the newer approaches  are often  given a high
priority by governments  and donors when additional funding becomes  available.
IV: Program Descriptions
This section focuses  on capital  grants  and allowances  targeted to  poor households  as these
are  the  kinds  of demand-side  subsidies  that  are  most  likely  to  be  recommended  and
implemented  today  in  the  housing  sector.  Capital  grants  and  allowances  typically  have
many of the  characteristics  of direct cash  transfers.  To  simplify  the following discussion,
we  focus  on  a  few  specific  variants  of  these  subsidies.  These  "models"  will  help  to
highlight  the  key  theoretical  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  various  kinds  of
subsidies.  However,  in practice,  governments  can alter and  implement  these approaches  in
ways that can have a profound impact on the actual effectiveness  of the subsidies.5
In  evaluating  the  relative  merits  of  social  assistance  programs,  it  is  particularly
important  to  focus  on  targeting,  efficiency,  transparency,  and  administrative  simplicity.
There  are  several  dimensions  to  targeting including  the  coverage  of the  poor  and  the
distribution  of the  subsidies  among those  covered.  Leakages to higher-income  households
are  also  an  important  targeting  issue.6 A  subsidy  is  efficient if it  encourages  market-
compatible  behavior,  avoids  price  distortions,  minimizes  program  costs,  and discourages
the waste  created  when households  do not fully appreciate  the  value of the  subsidies they
receive.  Demand-side  solutions  tend  to  be  efficient  because  they  offer  a  high  degree  of
consumer  choice,  which helps  achieve  a high level  of satisfaction  among  beneficiaries  at
the lowest possible cost. A subsidy  is transparent  when it is possible  to clearly identify the
beneficiaries  as well as  the cost of the subsidy.  In general,  demand-side  subsidies  that are
given  directly  to  households  are  more  transparent  than  supply-side  subsidies  in  which
benefits trickle down through producers  to households.  Finally, administrative simplicity is
yet another criterion  to consider  in evaluating  subsidy approaches  from  an implementation
4 From table  I in World Bank (1993).
5 It is important to understand  that variations  in  the way programs are  designed  can produce  outcomes  that are
not  normally  associated  with  a  particular  subsidy  approach.  For  example,  a  program  that  gives  a  housing
allowance  as a direct cash transfer that forces  a household to rent  a unit from  a limited selection  of units may
produce  outcomes  that  differ  little  from  a  traditional  supply-side  program  that  discounts  rents.  In  Russia,
military personnel relocating from the Baltics were given  capital grants to purchase new units but initially were
largely  forced  to  purchase  units  from builders  with  near monopoly  control  over  new  construction.  This  took
away many of the advantages of this demand-side approach.
6  Exclusion  errors  occur  when  needy  households  fail  to  receive  assistance.  Inclusion  errors  occur  when  non-
poor households  are mistakenly  given aid. The goal of policymakers  is to minimize both types of error.
4point  of  view,  as  administrative  costs  can  have  a  major  impact  on  the  targeting  and
effectiveness of a subsidy.
Capital  grants  and  housing  allowances  are examples  of demand-side  subsidies,  that is,
subsidies that are given directly to households  or directly  paid to service providers on behalf
of the households. We now look at each of these subsidies in turn.
Capital Grants
In the housing sector, capital  grants are one-time subsidies  to households  that they can use to
purchase,  build,  or complete  (new  or existing)  units  or to  rehabilitate  existing  units.7 The
grants  are  usually  funded  via  an  explicit  appropriation  process  within  the  government's
budget, which makes their cost transparent  to the public.  The fact that it is not necessary  to
seek  repeated  funding  to  assist  a  given  pool  of beneficiaries  makes  this  kind of subsidy
attractive  to  some  politicians.  On  the  other  hand,  capital  grants  often  involve  sizeable
amounts  of money per beneficiary,  which can make  it difficult for politicians to appropriate
funding.  To protect against fraud and waste, households  may be given their grants in tranches
according  to  what  progress  has  been  made  or  how much  work  has  been  completed.  The
amounts  involved can range from the modest  (for example,  the cost of connecting a house to
a utility) to the price of an entire dwelling (although typically not the entire cost).
It is clear from table  1 that capital  grants have  been popular in South America but are less
common in other countries.  Latin  American countries have tended  to implement  variations  on
the  so-called  "Chilean  mnodel."  This  emphasizes  government  policies  that:  (i)  shift  the
responsibility  for  housing  production  away  from  the  government  to  the  private  sector;  (ii)
provide  one-time  grants  for  home  purchase  while  curtailing  all  indirect  subsidies;  and  (iii)
institute transparent mechanisms for selecting beneficiaries  based  on household  income  and a
savings contribution. The Latin American experience contrasts sharply with that of Europe and
the  United  States,  where  demand-side  programs  have  largely  taken the  form  of allowances
given  to  renters.  Outside  Latin  America,  the  capital  grant  approach  has  occasionally  been
adopted  not as an ongoing  program but as a response to a particular problem.  For example,  in
Russia, capital grants were used to re-house military personnel returning  from the Baltic states,
and  in  Armenia,  they  are  currently  being  used  to  help  earthquake  victims  to  buy  existing
apartments.  In  South  Africa,  political  pressure  to  improve  the  housing  situation  rapidly
probably prompted the government to adopt the capital  grants approach.
Housing  Allowances
A housing allowance is a regular ongoing subsidy to households that offsets some of the costs
of their housing  and housing-related  services.  Allowances  can be provided to either owners or
renters,  and  they may be  used for new or  existing  housing.  Allowances  can take two forms.
Under  one  approach,  the  household  receives  a  fixed  subsidy based  on norms  of the typical
prices  prevailing in the housing market and must pay the  difference between  this amount and
the  total  rent  (or total  housing-related  expenditures)  of its  housing  unit.  As  a  result,  each
household's  contribution  will  vary  depending  upon  how  successful  it  is  in  finding  an
economical  unit.  If the  household  finds  an  acceptable  unit  that  costs  less  than  the  subsidy
7 They  are also used in conjunction  with housing finance programs  to "buy down" the prices of units. The idea
is to eliminate interest rate subsidies  by lowering  prices to the point where a household can  afford a market rate
loan for the difference.
5amount, it may keep the remaining amount of the allowance.  This approach gives households  a
powerful  incentive to shop for the best housing deal.
Table 1: Direct Demand-Side Subsidies by Country: 1996
Country  Subsidy type  Tenure  Dates'  Funding
Ongoing  programs
Latin America
Chile  Capital  grant  Owner  1978-present  National
Costa  Rica  Capital grant  Owner  1986-present  National
Colombia  Capital grant  Owner  1991-present  National
Uruguay  Capital grant  Owner  1991-present  National
El Salvador  Capital grant  Owner  1991-present  National
Chile  Capital grant  Owner  1978-present  National
Paraguay  Capital  grant  Owner  1991-present  National
Western Europe
Germany  Allowance  Owner/renter  1955-present  National/local
Sweden  Allowance  Renter  1930-present  National/local
United Kingdom  Allowance  Renter  1970-present  Local
Netherlands  Allowance  Renter  1970-present  National/local
France  Allowance  Renter  1948-present  National/local
Austria  Allowance  Renter  1960-present  National/local
Switzerland  Allowance  Renter  1950-present  Local
Norway  Allowance  Owner/renter  1960-present  Nationallocal
Finland  Allowance  Owner/renter  1941 -present  National
Denmark  Allowance  Renter  1955-present  National
Eastern Europe
Poland  Allowance  Renter  1995-present  National
Czech  Republic  Allowance  Owner/renter  1993-present  National
Slovakia  Allowance  Owner/renter  1997  National
Estonia  Allowance  Renter  1994-present  National
Latvia  Allowance  Renter  1994-1995  National/local
Lithuania  Allowance  Renter  1994-present  National
Ukraine  Allowance  Owner/renter  1995-present  National
Russian cities  Allowance  Renter  1994-present  Local
Other
Australia  Allowance  Renter  1945-present  National
Canadian provinces  Allowance  Renter  1970-present  Local
South Africa  Capital  grant  Owner  1996-present  National
United  States  Allowance  Renter  1979-present  National
Limited-Time Programs
Panama  Capital grant  Owner  1990  National
Mexico  Capital grant  Owner  1985  National/World Bank
Russia  Capital  grant  Owner  1994-present  United  States/Russian
national government
a. This table was prepared  in mid- 1996  and represents  the situation at that time
Source:  Adapted  from  Conway  and  Mikelsons  (1996),  based  on  data  contained  elsewhere,  including
Howenstine  (1986),  Mikelsons (1996),  World Bank (1985),  and other sources.
6Under the second  approach,  the  government  specifies  a fixed  amount  of money that  a
household  must  pay  towards  its  own  housing  costs  (usually  a  percentage  of its  income)
regardless of the total amount of its rent. The government pays the difference between what it
deems that the household is able to pay and the rent (or total housing-related  expenditures).
Under this system,  the size of the  subsidy varies  depending on the household's  contribution.
There  is little  incentive  for  a  household  to  shop  for  a  good  deal  because  it pays  the  same
amount under any scenario.  In fact,  a household  has an incentive to find the most expensive
eligible  unit that  it can  find,  making  this  a less  cost-effective  approach  than  the first.  The
attractiveness of this approach is that a household can be sure that it will have to pay no more
than  a  fixed  percentage  of its  income  on  its  housing-related  expenses.  This  approach  is
sometimes  called a burden limit.
Some housing  allowance  programs  have  features  of both the  norm-based  and  burden
limit  approaches.  For  example,  the  Russian  housing  allowance  program  sets  a  limit  for
acceptable housing expenses  based on social norms  and family size. An eligible family living
in a unit that has more space than necessary according to the social norm for the family size
will either have  to relocate  or pay the difference  between the subsidy  based on the norm  and
their  total  housing-related  expenditures.  However,  the  Russian  program  does  not  reward
families  that  find  an  acceptable  unit  for  less money  than it  is  entitled  to according  to the
social  norm.  Thus,  the  Russian  program  has  the  "stick"  of the  first approach  but not  the
"carrot."  It is like the second  approach in that under no circumstances  does  it hand out cash
to program beneficiaries.
The size  of subsidies  under  a housing  allowance  program  is determined  by "the  gap
formula."  According to this formula, the subsidy  amount is equal to the "payment standard"
minus the household  contribution (see box 1).  The payment standard  is usually tied to market
prices  and  social  norms.  It can  vary according  to households'  characteristics  (for example,
size)  and geography  and  is often based  on the gross  rent concept,  which includes  rent and
utilities.  The household  contribution  is defined  as  a proportion  of the  household's  income.
Usually,  the  formula  uses  a  measure  based  on adjusted  income  that takes  into  account  the
household's  characteristics,  tax liabilities, and assets.  The gap formula makes it easy to see
how,  once income is defined,  subsidy costs are sensitive to two variables that are within the
control  of  policymakers-the  payment  standard  and  the  percentage  of  income  that  a
household must devote to its housing-related expenditures.
Several  points  are  worth  noting  about  this  formula.  First,  the  same  method  applies
whether the  subsidy  is used  to assist households  with their  rental  payments  or their home
purchase payments.  Second, this methodology  is equally applicable to the calculation of one-
time capital grants.  The principle is the same: a one-time  subsidy equals  a payment standard
minus the household  contribution.  However,  in this case,  the payment  standard may be the
average  price of a new  dwelling  or the cost of an upgrade,  and the household  contribution
may be expressed as a factor of annual household income.  Finally, accurate income data may
not  be  available  for  the  income  variable  in  the  formula.  In  this  case,  the  household
contribution  may  have  to  be  determined  using  proxy  measures  or  simply  be  decided  by
program administrators.
7Box  1: The Gap Formula
Subsidy Amount = Payment  Standard - Household Contribution
S =P -cY
where:
S  = periodic subsidy payment
P = payment standard
The payment standard  is  typically based  on:
- social  norms/market prices
- household  size or other characteristics/geographic  price variation
- gross rent (rent  plus utilities) or any component of gross rent (for example,  utilities only)
cY = household contribution
The household  contribution has two components:
- percentage  of income devoted to housing-related  expenditures  (c)
- household income  (Y) which may be defined  and adjusted in many ways
Source: Authors
A housing  allowance,  in  spite  of its  name, represents  one way to  subsidize  a variety  of
housing-related  expenditures  such  as  utilities  and  maintenance  fees.  In  fact,  many  housing
allowance  programs  are  based  on  the  concept  of "gross  housing  expenditures,"  which,  in
addition to a rent component,  usually includes fees  for energy,  water, sewage,  and solid waste
disposal.  Conceptually,  it is useful  to think of housing as  something that produces  a "flow of
services,"  which  includes  the  services  provided by  utilities.  In transition  countries  that  have
transferred  ownership  of large public  housing  stocks  to  sitting  tenants,  housing  allowances
often help households to pay for maintenance  services and utilities rather than rent.
Table  2 outlines the major parameters  of three  capital  grant programs  and  one  housing
allowance  program.  Two of the  capital  grant programs  (in Armenia  and  Panama)  assisted
disaster victims,  and  the third  helped  Russian  military  personnel  to resettle  in Russia after
serving in the Baltic  countries,  while the housing  allowance program was also in Russia. The
number  of beneficiaries  in  these  three  programs  ranged  from  about  2,300  households  (in
Panama)  to  5,000  households  (in  Russia).  The  maximum  value  of the  subsidies  provided
varied  tremendously  (from  just  $3,000  in  Armenia  to  $25,000  in  Russia),  which  is  a
reflection of different market conditions and supply constraints.  An incentive  was included in
the Armenian and Russian  capital grant programs,  as beneficiaries  were allowed  to retain the
remaining  amount  of the  subsidy  that  exceeded  the  price  of their  accommodation.  The
Panama example  is interesting because  participants  in the program were allowed  to combine
their  capital  grant  with  other,  less  transparent  subsidies.  The  Russian  housing  allowance
program reminds  us that it is possible  to take more  than one approach  in any given country.
This program does not provide  very large monthly payments but does reach  a larger number
of poor households than Russia's resettlement grant program does.
8Table 2: Program Examples
Armenia Earthquake  Russia Officer  Panama  Plan Chorrillo  Russia Housing
Zone  Resettlement  Allowances
Purpose of program  Provide housing  for  Provide  housing in  Rehouse families  from  Provide means-tested
uncompensated victims  Russia for military  Chorrillo neighborhood  assistance  for monthly
of 1988 earthquake  officers resettled  from  of Panama City  housing and utility fees
bases in the Baltic  destroyed by fire  in 1990
countries
Number of beneficiaries  300 (Pilot project)  5,000 (US-funded  2,300  Nationwide
3,000 (Extended  program)  approximately  6%  of the
program beginning  in  population, according to
2001)  survey data
Period  1998 to present  1993 to present  1991  - 1993  1995  to present
Subsidy
Maximum  amount  $  3,000  $25,000  $6,750  Approximately $10
Amount paid out  Subsidy (even  in excess  Subsidy (even  in excess  Lower of subsidy or  monthly (in  1996)
of sales price)  of sales price)  sales price  [allowance  is difference
between the maximum
social rent and the share
of household income
expected  to be paid for
rent]
Other resources
Supply-side subsidies  No  No  Yes  (for public housing  No
Construction  financing  No  No  only)  No
Loan financing  No  No  Yes (for public housing  No
only)
Orientation  program  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Yes
Eligible  uses of subsidy
New housing  Yes (anywhere  in the  Yes (only  in selected  Yes  (anywhere  in the  Yes
Existing housing  country)  city or state)  country)  Yes
Other  Yes (anywhere  in  the  Yes (only in selected  Yes (anywhere  in the
country)  city or state)  country)
Yes (long-term  contract
with retirement home)
Eligible sources of
housing  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Private developers  Yes  Yes  No  Yes
State-owned  housing  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Current owners  No  No  No  No
Non-profit
Sources: Struyk  (1997),  Conway  and Mikelsons  (1996),  Urban  Institute  (2000),  and Romanik  and  Struyk
(1995).
V: Program Design  and Implementation
Policymakers  routinely  introduce  variations  into the design of housing  subsidy programs  in
response to philosophical, political, and resource constraints.  As mentioned earlier, the model
subsidy  approaches  we  have  discussed  up  until  now  can  take  on  substantially  different
attributes depending on how they are implemented.  Considerations about limited institutional
capacity  or  the  need  to  contain  administrative  costs  may  prompt  policymakers  to  make
compromises  in the design  and  features of a  program.  In this section,  we  examine  several
interrelated design and implementation  topics that have a significant  impact on the targeting,
9efficiency,  and  transparency  of programs.  We  conclude  with  a brief discussion  of ways  to
control administrative  costs.
Participation  Rates
To  target  subsidies  effectively,  policymakers  must  successfully  enroll  the  intended
beneficiary  households  in the  program.  For housing  allowance  and  capital  grant  programs,
participation involves  more than simply enrolling in the program. Households  must also find
housing  units  that  satisfy  the  program's  requirements  regarding  quality  and  social  norms
before they can  receive payments.  In these programs,  the participation  rate (in other words,
the  share  of eligible  households  that  actually  receive  a  subsidy)  can  be  mathematically
expressed  as the product of the percentage  of eligible households that enrolls  in the program
and the percentage  of the enrolled households that qualifies to receive payments.  It is helpful
to think of participation  in terms  of a two-stage  process  because  it suggests  there  are  two
chances  for policymakers  to manipulate the participation  rate.
Policymakers  seeking to increase participation  can intervene in a number of ways during
the enrollment phase.  An obvious  way to increase  enrollment  is to increase  the benefit level
by raising the subsidy or reducing a household's  expected  contribution.  Another approach  is
to  improve  outreach  efforts  by  disseminating  information  through  the  media,  community
organizations,  or social workers.  Part of the outreach efforts may involve reducing the social
stigma  associated  with  accepting  public  assistance.  Policymakers  can  also  stimulate
enrollment  by reducing  households'  transaction costs.  Enrollment  remains  low when people
find  it difficult to  travel  to  the locations  where  they must apply  to  the  program  because  of
time  constraints,  transportation  expenses,  or  a  disability.  Having  to  produce  expensive
documentation  of their  eligibility  for  the  program  (such  as  birth  certificates  or  proof  of
residency)  also increases  their transaction  costs  and, thus, restricts  enrollment.  The need for
documentation  also introduces the possibility of corruption  on the part of those who issue the
required paperwork.
Enrolling  in  a housing  allowance  or  capital  grant  program  does  not  ensure  that  an
eligible  household  will  receive a subsidy.  This  is because  these programs  typically  require
households to find a housing unit that meets minimum quality standards or social norms. For
example,  a  household  may  have  to  move  from  its  existing  house  to  receive  a  housing
allowance  because,  by  the  program's  specifications,  the  existing  unit  is  physically
substandard  or too  small  for the  size  of the  family.  If the  burden  of moving  is  too  great
relative  to the benefits that they would receive from the program, then the household  is likely
to forego the subsidy and stay put.
Improving the quality  of housing and utility  services for the poor may be  a goal of the
program,  but policymakers  must  be  aware  that  setting  quality  standards  will  increase  the
administrative  costs  and  institutional  capacity  required  for  the  program.  Usually  when
minimum  quality standards  are  part of a program's  design, professional  inspectors  must be
employed  to verify that  the beneficiary's  unit meets these  minimum standards.  In  Russia's
housing  allowance  program,  families  are  not  required  to  prove  that  their  houses  meet
particular  quality  standards;  rather,  they  apply  based  on  their  existing  housing.  The  most
pressing  need  for poor  Russian  families  is to  cover  their  current housing  expenses,  not to
improve their housing  situation. However,  in a country such as  South Africa where  the poor
10historically have  lived  in  substandard  housing,  the  inclusion of quality  standards  may  be  a
politically important aspect of the program.
In a tight housing market,  it can be extremely difficult  for households  to find affordable
housing that meets  a program's  requirements  even with their subsidies.  By lowering  quality
standards  or norms,  policymakers  can make  more housing  available to participants,  but this
can be controversial.  Neither the sponsors nor the beneficiaries of allowance and capital grant
programs  may  like  the idea  of the  beneficiaries  having  to  accept  housing  of lower  quality
than that enjoyed by the beneficiaries of other programs.  Housing allowance and capital  grant
programs  usually set a time limit on how long a household  can take to search  for a unit or to
negotiate  and complete  a deal  with a builder.  After this time limit expires, the allowance  or
grant is then given to another household.  Sometimes a deal with a landlord or developer  falls
apart  but not  because  of the  actions  of the  household.  In these  instances,  households  are
usually given a second chance to qualify for their allowances or capital grants.
Governments  usually help people  to find acceptable  units,  sometimes  by working  with
private  sector  developers  and  brokers  to  assist  prospective  buyers  or  tenants.  Also,
governments  can  instigate  media campaigns  to  attract  landlords  and  builders  and  establish
information centers where individuals, landlords, brokers, and developers  can post listings. In
situations where households  are reluctant to use the services  of brokers because  they regard
them as an unnecessary  expense, the  government  must provide consumer  education.  In tight
housing markets, this marketing assistance is critical to the success of a program.
Housing  programs  can  be fairly complicated.  In  most cases,  participants  and  potential
suppliers  may need  to be  informed  about how the program works  and  about  any  program-
related obligations  they may face.  In countries  where  the population  is not used  to market-
based transactions,  beneficiaries may have difficulty negotiating deals with the private sector
suppliers and may need additional  counseling.  In the case of home purchases  using a capital
grant,  for example,  an  illiterate  elderly  beneficiary  may require  a high  degree  of "hand-
holding" to negotiate legal and financial documents.
Turnover and Recertification
In designing or evaluating a housing subsidy program, policymakers  cannot ignore the effect
that  turnover  among  beneficiaries  has  on  the  program's  costs  and  outcomes.  The  only
information  available  in many cases  is a snapshot of how many households are participating
in  a  program  at  a  given  moment.  This  snapshot,  however,  does  not  reveal  how  many
households  have participated  or will  participate  over  time.  High  turnover  can  increase  the
total number of beneficiaries to the point where it has a major impact on administrative  costs,
particularly the costs of outreach efforts and of certifying eligibility.
Turnover  in housing programs  is influenced by  external  factors that are particular  to a
country,  such  as household  mobility  and the  rate  at which households  move in  and  out of
poverty over time.  From  the  point  of view  of program  design,  such  factors determine  the
frequency  with which a program requires  a household to reestablish  its eligibility  to receive
assistance.  There is a tradeoff between  the costs of recertifying  households  and the  savings
generated  by eliminating  those  who are  no longer  eligible  for receiving  benefits.  There  are
administration  costs incurred by the program as well as the time and other costs incurred by
I1the beneficiaries  who must provide  new documentation.  While fairly frequent recertification
would seem to be an obvious way to improve targeting, the costs of this are often prohibitive.
Means Testing
Housing allowances  and capital  grants  can use means testing to determine eligibility,  benefit
levels,  or both.  Conducting  means  tests  can  improve the targeting  of benefits  substantially
but can  be difficult  to implement  administratively.  Reliable  income  data  are  in  short supply
in  many  countries,  especially  when  the  poor  obtain  a  large  share  of their  income  from
informal  sources.  If means  testing  is  used,  the  government  must ensure  that  the  poor can
participate  in the program despite the difficulty of verifying their income from these sources.
Because  reliable  income  and  asset  data are  often  nonexistent,  some  countries  rely on
proxy measures of income  to determine  eligibility and benefit  levels.  An income proxy is a
non-monetary  indicator  that  is assumed  to  be highly  correlated  with income.  For example,
the  acreage  of farmland  owned  by a  household,  the  ownership  of a  car,  or the  volume  of
electricity  consumed  by  a  household  all  might  be  used  to estimate  a  household's  wealth.
However,  even  the  best proxy systems  can  suffer  from  substantial  exclusion  and  inclusion
errors.8 To  minimize  exclusion  errors,  the  governments  who  use  proxy  systems  usually
establish some sort of procedure for protesting decisions about eligibility.  Some governments
reserve discretionary funds to help those whom the system may fail.9
Some  countries  may  simply  decide  to  rely  on  self-reported  estimates  of  income
combined  with  a  system  that  attempts  to  verify  as  much  information  as  possible  within
reason.  This  approach  can  be  enhanced  by  imposing  harsh  legal  penalties  for  lying  and
putting  strong  social  pressure  on  applicants  by  educating  the  public  about  the  program's
eligibility requirements.  In some  programs,  the names  of beneficiaries  are publicly  posted,
which results  in a certain  degree of public policing.  When a government  wants to use means
testing,  it  has  to  weigh  the  tradeoffs  between  potential  abuses  by  households  in  a  self-
reporting system and the limitations of a proxy income system.
Despite these problems, means testing is the surest way to target subsidies to the poor.  It
is  not  surprising  to  find  non-poor  households  benefiting  from  housing  programs  when
eligibility  is not tied  to  income.  For example,  programs  that  offer assistance  to pensioners,
veterans,  civil  servants,  disaster victims, widows,  or orphans  cannot guarantee  that benefits
will  go  largely  to  poor  households.  In  the  case  of housing,  waiting  lists  may  have  been
compiled with  little regard  to  income,  instead relying  on  criteria  such as  social  norms  for
living  space.'0 Waiting  lists  often  suffer  from  transparency  problems  where  it  is  not  clear
how a household  moves  up  the  list or why other  households  continue  to  be  far  down  the
queue. In designing new programs, it may be desirable to circumvent existing lists in favor of
other eligibility criteria.
8 Some  countries  with  proxy  systems,  such  as  Armenia,  have  a strong  bias  against  inclusion  errors.  From  a
political  perspective,  failing  to  assist  a truly  needy  household  (in  other  words,  an  exclusion  error)  may  be
preferable  to  mistakenly  allowing  an  undeserving  household  to  benefit  (in other  words,  an  inclusion  error),
especially when there is a high level of government distrust.
9 Care must be taken to not give too much discretionary power to government bodies or the program may not be
sufficiently transparent.
10 A social  norm  for  living  space  is  typically  expressed  in  terms  of square  meters  per person.  A  household
occupying a housing unit with insufficient  living space would be regarded as overcrowded.
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By  monitoring  key  aspects  of  a  program's  performance,  a  government  can  gather  the
information  that  it needs  to  modify  or  fine-tune  the  program.  The  cost  of this monitoring
should  be  built into  the  project from  the  start.  The  government  should  define  performance
indicators  in advance  so arrangements  can be  made to collect the necessary  data,  including
indicators  on the  beneficiaries  as  well  as  on  the  implementation  and  administration  of the
program.  Information  on beneficiary  characteristics,  subsidy costs,  administrative  costs,  and
other aspects of the program  can be used to demonstrate the benefits, transparency,  and cost-
effectiveness of the program.
ControllingAdministrative  Costs.
A recurring theme in this section is that the outcomes of the program depend a great deal on
the  institutional  capacity  of  the  government  body  responsible  for  its  implementation.
Building  institutional  capacity  increases  the  administrative  cost  of  programs.  Outreach
efforts,  recertification,  means  testing,  and  monitoring  all  require  substantial  staff  and
resources.  Funding  is  required  for  personnel,  training,  transportation,  record-keeping
systems, office space, and equipment.
There  are  a number  of ways  to  hold  down  administrative  costs.  In  some  instances,  it
may be possible to piggyback part of a housing program onto another government program.
For example,  a new program  could take advantage  of a means-testing  system that is already
in place for a general cash assistance program.  A network of health social workers might be
enlisted  to disseminate  information  about  a housing  program.  Governments  can also  enlist
the  aid  of non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs)  to  educate  consumers  and  perform
outreach activities.
VI: Determining an Appropriate Approach
Finally,  we describe  the situations for which each of the  various subsidy approaches  is likely
to  be  most  effective.  Table  3  summarizes  the  key  advantages  and  disadvantages  of the
programs  described  in this  report  with respect  to  targeting,  transparency,  price  distortion,
institutional capacity,  administrative  costs, and funding.  The table helps to highlight some of
the tradeoffs that policymakers  must make in selecting a particular approach.
If economists  and  policymakers  were  to  have  their  choice  of an  ideal  approach  to
subsidizing  housing  expenditures,  they  would  probably  avoid  programs  earmarked  for
housing  altogether  in  favor of a general  means-tested  cash benefit  in which  the  subsidy  is
partly based  on housing  consumption norms.  However,  as noted at the outset,  the desire by
society  or  government  to  encourage  consumption  of these  goods  and  the potentially  high
expense  of these programs  often makes  this option impractical.  Nevertheless,  a government
that already  has  a cash  benefit program may want to  consider the  possibility of using  it to
deliver housing-related  subsidies, especially if the subsidies are not large.
A capital  grant  is  a  flexible  transparent  subsidy  that does  not  distort  prices.  Capital
grants  can  be  used  for any  kind  of housing-related  expenditure,  but they are  often  used  to
support  homeownership  in some  manner.  The main drawback  of this approach  is that it is
often administratively  complex  and requires  a considerable  amount of institutional  capacity
(although less than an allowance  program).  The administrative  burden is partly a function of
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systems  for  enrollment,  verifying  eligibility,  and  monitoring.  The  one-time  nature  of the
grant  frees  a  government  or  donor  from  having  to  make  a  long-term  commitment  to  the
program, although grant programs can be operated on a sustained basis.
Table 3: Summary of Key Program Attributes
Program  Type
Program
attribute  Capital  grant  Allowance (norm-based)  Allowance (burden limit)
Targeting  Good targeting potential depends  Same.  Same.
on outreach,  benefit levels,  and
other factors affecting
enrollment and participation;
coverage limited by budget
constraints.
Transparency  High level  of transparency;  easy  Same.  Same.
to identify costs and
beneficiaries.
Price Distortion  No price distortion if household  Little price distortion if  Can strongly distort
faces market prices for units or  household  faces market prices  prices because the
services provided  by the private  for units or services provided by  household contribution
sector.  the private  sector, and payment  toward expenditures  is
standard is  correctly set.  fixed.
Institutional  Places fairly high demand  on  Same.  Same.
Capacity  staff and other resources;
requires  skills and capabilities
that may not presently exist.
Administrative  Similar to allowances,  but  Can be relatively  high per  Same as norm-based
Costs  somewhat simpler due to one-  beneficiary due  to outreach,  allowance.




Funding  Does not require ongoing  Requires ongoing funding;  may  Same as norm-based
funding; subsidy costs can vary  have to appropriate through  allowance.
depending  on the size of grants,  budget request; subsidy amounts
which can range from the cost of depend on which housing-related
a minor upgrade to the price of a  services  the program covers.
new unit.
Source: Authors and World Bank (1993)
Capital grants have proven to be particularly useful in the aftermath of natural disasters,
in  supporting  relocation  efforts,  and  in  complementing  housing  finance  programs.  Despite
having a certain degree  of administrative  complexity,  it is possible  to  put a grant program
into  operation  fairly quickly.  Because  they can  be  used to  purchase  or rehabilitate  existing
units  or to build  new units,  capital  grants  can  be effective  in both tight  and loose  housing
markets.  A capital  grant program  works best where there  is a well-developed  private  sector
that  can readily supply  and rehabilitate  units.  If a  country  has  a housing  finance  system,  a
capital  grant program  can make market-rate loans affordable  to households  (by lowering the
14principal on loans).  By requiring households  to make  contributions,  the subsidy  level of the
capital grant can be reduced.
A  housing  allowance  program  is most  likely  to  be  acceptable  in  a  relatively  well-off
country with a solid  institutional capacity,  secure  tenure,  and a relatively  sound,  high- quality
housing  stock.  An  allowance  program  is unlikely  to  be  appropriate  in  a  very  poor  country
where  the  government  may  have  trouble  sustaining  recurring  subsidy  payments  and  where
there is not much  support for providing cash assistance to renters  or owners who remain in the
substandard  or informal  housing that may  make up  a large  share  of the  total housing  stock.
Also, housing  allowances  probably  will not work  well  in tight housing  markets  in which the
supply  of affordable  units  is limited  as they  are  not  as effective  as capital  grants  in directly
encouraging  new  construction.  Given  these  attributes,  it  is  not  surprising  that,  in  the  past
decade, housing allowances have primarily been used in transition countries. In these countries,
allowances  form  a  part  of  the  social  safety  net  and  are  often  intended  to  help  protect
households from reform-related  increases in the prices of maintenance fees, utilities, and rent.
All  else being  equal,  a norm-based  allowance  is preferable  to  a burden-limit  allowance
because  of the price distortions introduced  under the burden-limit  approach.  The approaches
are  otherwise  similar  in that  they are  both  transparent  and  have  good  targeting  potential."I
The expense of these programs,  however, may make it necessary  for the government to ration
the  subsidies,  thus  limiting  the  coverage  of the  poor.  Also,  many  poor  people  may  be
discouraged from participating by low benefit levels, burdensome enrollment procedures,  and
other  program  requirements.  The  ongoing  nature  of  allowances  makes  them  more
administratively  complex  than  capital  grants,  and,  in  some  countries  with  a  lack  of
institutional  capacity,  this may  deter some  policymakers  from  adopting  this  approach.  The
on-budget  nature of allowances  may  be  politically  difficult  to  accept,  but the  cost may  be
more  palatable if the  government can  show that replacing  inefficient traditional  supply-side
programs with allowances  will generate savings.
The high cost of many capital  grant and housing allowance programs  means they are not
always useful  ways to expand housing assistance  to cover poor households,  especially in low-
income  countries.  Upgrading  existing  housing  and  infrastructure  is  usually  the  most  cost-
effective way to improve the living conditions of large numbers of geographically  concentrated
poor households,  particularly  in situations  wlhere  many of the poor occupy  informal  housing
with insecure  tenure.  Some types of upgrading  or renovation by individual households can be
financed  by  small  capital  grants.  However,  upgrading  many  basic  services  (such  as  water
supply, sanitation, and drainage) requires the cooperation of entire communities.
Perhaps  one of the  best uses of capital  grants  and  allowances  is to  help  to phase  out
traditional  supply-side  programs.  Capital  grants  and  allowances  can  help  a  government to
reduce  its involvement  in the direct production of housing and to encourage the development
of the  private  sector.  In  replacing  a  direct  construction  program  with  a  capital  grant  or
allowance  program, the government does not have to procure new funding. It can simply use
the money it has already committed to the sector in a more efficient manner.
" Targeting  is  usually less effective  under the burden-limit  approach, depending on the size of the subsidy  and
the responses of households to the price distortions  introduced by this approach.
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